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Abstract—Information-Centric Networking is a promising net-
working paradigm that overcomes many of the limitations
of current networking architectures. Various research efforts
investigate solutions for securing ICN. Nevertheless, most of
these solutions relax security requirements in favor of network
performance. In particular, they weaken end-user privacy and
the architecture’s tolerance to security breaches in order to
support middleboxes that offer services such as caching and
content replication. In this paper, we adapt TLS, a widely used
security standard, to an ICN context. We design solutions that
allow session reuse and migration among multiple stakeholders
and we propose an extension that allows authorized middleboxes
to lawfully and transparently intercept secured communications.
I. INTRODUCTION
Information-Centric Networking (ICN) brings the promise
of a more secure and privacy friendly Internet. Indeed, the
inherent security properties of ICN, including the requirement
for explicit signaling of information availability and demand,
are expected to significantly reduce phishing, spamming, and
(D)DoS attacks. Nevertheless, this does not mean that ICN
architectures are inherently secure, or that no additional se-
curity measures are required. On the contrary, ICN seems
to lack a comprehensive security solution. This can be at-
tributed to two main reasons. Firstly, ICN departs from the
traditional endpoint oriented communication and adopts a
content-centric communication paradigm. This shift in the
communication plane impedes the (direct) adoption of existing
security solutions and protocols. Secondly, ICN promotes the
use of middleboxes (e.g., caches, content replication points)
and information flow aggregation (e.g., by using multicast),
which cannot be easily combined with security and privacy
enhancing mechanisms.
In this paper we propose a TLS-based security protocol
which allows introducing middleboxes in an ICN architecture.
In particular, we propose mechanisms that can be used for
transforming TLS from a host oriented protocol to a content
oriented one, allowing different phases of the protocol (con-
cerning the same piece of content) to be executed by different
(authenticated) endpoints. Moreover, we present an extension
to our protocol that allows authorized middleboxes to lawfully
and transparently intercept secured transactions.
The structure of the remainder of this paper is as follows:
In Section II we define a generic ICN model which is used
as a reference architecture for our solution. In Section III
we detail the proposed solution. In Section IV we present
an extension to our solution that enables middleboxes. In
Section VI we discuss ICN security solutions, as well as, the
problems middleboxes face when end-to-end security solutions
are used. Finally, we evaluate our solution in Section V, from
both the security and performance perspectives. We provide a
summary and present our conclusions in Section VII.
II. ICN REFERENCE ARCHITECTURE
Our solution is not bound to a particular ICN approach.
Instead, in this section we define a generic ICN reference
architecture that can be mapped to most ICN proposals. Our
model consists of the following entities:
• Owner: The entity that creates and owns a content item.
The owner is responsible for assigning names to content
items. The role of the owner captures real world entities
(e.g., an author, a university, a company, a government).
• Subscriber: A network device owned by a real word entity
that is interested in receiving a content item
• Publisher: A network device that actually hosts a content
item.
All content items are identified by a name. A content name
in our model is composed of two parts: a prefix which is
an ICN routable name and is used by all (inter-)networking
functions, and a suffix which can be hidden from the network.
Henceforth, the term name will refer to the prefix of a content
item name.
Our model entities interact with each other in the following
manner: An owner creates a content item and makes available
a copy of it to at least one publisher. Publishers advertise
the names of the content items they host. Subscribers sub-
scribe to content item names in which they are interested. A
subscription triggers a process (which is out of the scope of
our model) that results in a publisher issuing a publication
that contains the desired item. This publications is forwarded
by the network to the intended subscriber(s). A publication
message includes a forwarding identifier. Forwarding identi-
fiers are used by forwarding devices in order to take proper
forwarding decisions. When we refer to a content item name,
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we will use the notation “name”, whereas when we refer to
a forwarding identifier, we will use the notation [name]. In
many ICN architectures “name”==[name], i.e., the name of a
content item is also used as a forwarding identifier.
A. Security model
Each content owner owns a public-private key pair. The
public keys of content owners are considered known to the
subscribers (or, there exists a secure mechanism for learning
them). Our security model considers two types of publishers:
trusted publishers and regular publishers. A trusted publisher
has been authorized by a content owner to store certain
content items. This authorization can be proven using an x.509
digital certificate signed by the content owner. This certificate
includes the content “names” for which the publisher is
authorized, using the subject alternative name extension [1].
Moreover, this certificate can be used for establishing secure
connections. A regular publisher just happens to store a
content item, but cannot prove it is authorized to store that
item. Nevertheless, in the general case these publishers do not
act maliciously. A regular publisher can be a cache, a content
replication point, and generally any middlebox. In Section IV
we present a mechanism with which a regular publisher can
be become authorized for a specific transaction.
III. SOLUTION OVERVIEW
The cornerstone of our solution is a handshake protocol
that results in the establishment of a symmetric encryption
key and if necessary of an HMAC key,1 between a subscriber
and a publisher. These keys are then used for protecting the
transmitted content. Our handshake protocol is an adaptation
of the TLS handshake protocol (section 7.4 of [2]).
Our handshake protocol is composed of four messages:
two subscriptions and two publications. In the following we
consider that both subscriptions are received by the same
trusted publisher. In Section III-A we present solutions that
can be used when this is not possible/desirable (i.e., these
solutions allow a subscriber to begin the handshake with a
publisher and finish it with another). The subscriptions that
are part of the handshake protocol must not be aggregatable.
This can be achieved using various mechanisms, e.g., by not
aggregating – in general – subscriptions that do not have the
same payload, by using a “special” flag, or by appending a
statistically unique nonce to the content name included in
the subscription. Moreover, the publications that are part of
the handshake protocol should not be cachable, as a cached
publication will result in an unsuccessful handshake.2
The protocol starts with the subscriber sending a subscrip-
tion for the desired item. The payload of this subscription
message contains the fields of the Client Hello TLS
message. In order to achieve forward secrecy the preferred key
1If authenticated symmetric encryption is used, e.g., AES-GCM, then an
HMAC algorithm is not required
2It is the equivalent of “injecting” a previously captured server TLS
handshake response.
exchange algorithm must always be (elliptic-curve) ephemeral
Diffie-Hellman–(EC)DHE.
The subscription message is routed to a publisher. As-
suming that this is a new session (we discuss ses-
sion reuse in Section III-A), the publisher responds with
a publication. This publication contains the fields of
the Server Hello, Server Certificate, Server
Key Exchange, Certificate Request, and Server
Hello Done TLS messages. This messages also includes a
signature that can be validated using the publisher’s certificate.
With the reception of this publication the subscriber verifies
that a publisher is trusted by validating the received digital
signature. If the validation is successful, the subscriber sends a
new subscription for the same item. This time the subscription
payload contains the fields of the Client Key Exchange,
Change Cipher Spec, and Finished TLS messages.
When the publisher receives this subscription it should be
able to associate it with the state generated during the the first
step of the handshake. Currently, TLS server implementations
use the [source IP, source port] pair of the received TLS
packets in order to maintain state. However, not all ICN ar-
chitectures have similar packet fields, i.e., a field that contains
a subscriber-specific location identifier that makes possible
for a publisher to tell if two subscriptions have originated
from the same subscriber. If no such information exists then
two approaches can be considered: if in the first subscription
message a nonce was appended to the content name (in order
to prevent subscription aggregation) then the same nonce can
be used in this subscription; alternatively, the subscriber can
include in the subscription payload the TLS session identifier.
The publisher completes the handshake by responding to this
subscription with a publication that contains the fields of the
Change Cipher Spec and Finish TLS messages.
A. Session migration
We now consider the case where content items can be
provided by a group of trusted publishers and we discuss how
a subscriber that has initiated a session with a group member
can continue it with another. In order to implement this
functionality we use the session ticket TLS extension [3]. With
this extension a publisher can encrypt all secret information
and parameters of a session in a ticket, store the key required
to decrypt the ticket locally, and transmit the ticket to the
subscriber; then the subscriber may use the ticket to request
the reuse of previous settings. In order for all group members
to be able to decrypt a ticket they should agree on the same
encryption key. This key can be randomly and periodically
generated by a key generator and proactively published to the
group members. Twitter for example, uses a similar approach
in which a set of key generator machines generate and store
in all twitter’s web servers a fresh ticket encryption key every
12 hours [4]. It should be noted, however, that this approach
relaxes the requirement for perfect forward secrecy: a stolen
ticket encryption key can be used for decrypting all sessions
that used tickets encrypted with this key (e.g., in the case of
twitter, all user sessions within a 12 hours window).
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Fig. 1. A middlebox that lawfully intercepts a secured communication session to aggregate subscriptions for the same content item.
IV. ENABLING MIDDLEBOXES
We now describe an extension to our solution that allows
a regular publisher to lawfully intercept secured communica-
tions. With this extension a regular publisher is authorized by
a trusted publisher to intercept a single session. That regular
publisher (henceforth referred to as the middlebox) learns
only secret information related to the intercepted session,
i.e., it does not learn any long lasting secret. Moreover,
this extension requires no modification of the protocol in
the subscriber’s side, therefore, subscribers are completely
oblivious to middleboxes. These middleboxes are equipped
with a trusted publisher certificate but not with the secret
information associated with this certificate.
With our handshake protocol a subscriber is able to tell if
a publisher is trusted by using the digital signature included
in the first publication of the handshake protocol. This ver-
ification is an integral part of the handshake protocol and
a handshake must not be considered successful if this step
fails. A middlebox is not able to generate this signature,
since it requires the trusted publisher’s secret key. In order
to successfully complete the handshake, a middlebox should:
(i) establish a secured session with the trusted publisher, and
(ii) send a signature request that contains the name of the
requested content and the data to be signed. Upon receiving
the signature request the trusted publisher first checks if the
middlebox can handle a subscription for this content name. If
this check is successful, the trusted publisher uses its secret
key and signs the necessary fields. Finally, it sends the digital
signature back to the middlebox. As a next step, the middlebox
sends a publication back to the subscriber that includes the
digital signature. Now, the handshake can be successfully
completed. It should be noted that a middlebox does not have
to establish a secured session with the trsusted publisher for
every subscriber: an established secured session can be used
for transmitting multiple signature requests. Moreover, step (ii)
has to take place for every new session, therefore, a trusted
publisher can at any time refuse a signature request, stopping
this way a specific transaction.
Figure 1 illustrates an interesting use case of this extension.
In this use case, two subscribers subscribe to the same content
item. A middlebox intercepts both these subscriptions and
at the same time subscribes to the desired item. After all
subscriptions are completed there is a single data flow from
the trusted publisher to the middlebox; the middlebox decrypts
and re-encrypts this flow and transmits it to the subscribers.
An interesting security property of this use case is that a third
party observing the encrypted data of these flows is not able
to tell whether these flows concern the same content or not.
A notable property of this extension is that trusted pub-
lishers can keep track of item access statistics: everytime a
middlebox sends a signature request, it includes that name
of the content item concerned, hence, a trusted publisher can
track the number of times a content item has been requested.
A. HTTPS-to-ICN gateway
This extension can also be applied to legacy TLS. An
interesting application that can be built using our extension
is a middlebox that acts as a HTTPS-to-ICN gateway. This
gateway could allow a legacy HTTPS client to retrieve a
content item from (or through) an ICN network. If plain
HTTP were used then the approach described in [5] could
have been used; with this approach the gateway translates the
web server’s domain name into a content item name and issues
the appropriate subscription. When TLS is used the gateway
should map the destination IP-port of the first TLS packet to
a domain name. This is required not only for the domain to
content name translation but also because the gateway should
respond to the client with a server certificate. Fortunately, the
Server Name Indication TLS extension [6] can be used to
solve this problem. With this extension a TLS client includes
in its hello message the domain name of the server with
which it wants to connect. Another consideration is how the
HTTPS client can verify the integrity of the received item. This
problem is related to the fact that the gateway can manipulate
in an undetectable way a content item. This problem should
be solved in the application layer, for example the client could
retrieve directly from the server the item’s hash and compare
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Fig. 2. Sample evaluation topology.
it with the hash of the item it received. In any case, no
modification is required to the TLS client.
V. EVALUATION
A. Performance evaluation
We now examine the delay that is introduced by our
solution. We consider the sample topology of Figure 2. In this
figure there is a subscriber, a middlebox that acts as content
replication point, and a trusted publisher. The subscriber wants
to subscribe to an item that is stored in both the middlebox and
the publisher. The latency of the link between the subscriber
and the middlebox is L, whereas the latency of the link
between the middlebox and the publisher is α ∗ L, where α
is a variable. We assume that the latency of the links is the
same for both directions. We compare the time required for
the subscriber to receive the first packet of the publication
when three security solutions are used: our solution without
middlebox support, our solution with middlebox support, and a
dummy solution described in the following. When the dummy
solution is used, the content is encrypted with a symmetric
encryption key and stored in the middlebox. A subscriber
sends simultaneously a subscription message to the middlebox
and a key request message to the publisher. Therefore, the
delay introduced in this case is the time required for the
key request message to reach the publisher plus the time
required for the publisher response to reach the subscriber, i.e.,
2 ∗ (L+ α ∗ L).3 When our solution is used, we assume that
the first packet arrives immediately after the last publication of
the handshake. Figure 3 shows the delay introduced by each
solution measured as a function of α.
B. Security evaluation
The security of our solution without middlebox support
relies on the security properties of TLS and the negotiated
security algorithms. In particular, our solution provides the
following security properties:
• Verification that a publisher is trusted. With our solution
a subscriber is able to tell is a publisher is authorized to
host a particular content item. In contrast to host-oriented
architectures, there is no notion of publisher identity and
hence publisher authentication.
• Content confidentiality and integrity. With our solution a
symmetric encryption key and (if necessary) an HMAC
key are produced. These keys can be used for securing
content confidentiality and integrity.
3In all cases, we consider that the processing time is negligible.
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Fig. 3. Time required for the first packet of the publication to reach the
subscriber (measured in multiples of the latency L) as a function of α.
• Unobservability and unlinkability. A malicious 3rd party
that monitors network flows (or even tampers with them)
is able to tell only the prefix of the content items names
and not the full name (unobservability). Moreover, a
malicious 3rd party is not able to tell whether two distinct
network flows concern the same content item, or not
(unlinkability). These two properties are closely related
to end-user privacy.
• Perfect forward secrecy. With our solution there is no
single secret value that can be used to compromise
multiple, already completed transactions
When middleboxes are supported, the following security prop-
erties hold:
• Trusted publishers have control of the process. Indeed, if
a trusted publisher refuses to accept a signature request
the handshake will never be completed. Therefore, a pub-
lisher may even completely refuse to use middleboxes.
• The middlebox learns no trusted publisher-related secret.
The only secret information that a middlebox learns are
the session secrets, negotiated with the subscriber.
Nevertheless some security precautions should be consid-
ered. The trusted publisher has no control over the negoti-
ated security algorithms, therefore subscriber implementations
should make sure that only secure algorithms are supported.
Moreover, a middlebox is able to modify a content item with-
out being detected, therefore content authenticity mechanisms
should be in place. Another security measure that should
be considered when trusted publishers allow middleboxes
to intercept secured communication, is to make sure that
no content item that may jeopardize subscriber security is
offered via a middlebox. For example, middleboxes should
be prevented from handling subscribers’ credentials. This can
be achieved by naming all sensitive content items using a pre-
defined name and by making sure that trusted publishers will
always prevent middleboxes from intercepting a session that
concerns such an item.
VI. RELATED WORK
A. ICN security solutions
In general, most ICN related security solutions follow the
same pattern: a piece of content is encrypted with a symmetric
key and then this key is encrypted in a way that only legitimate
subscribers can decrypt it. Using the same encryption key for
all subscribers has the advantage that encrypted content can be
cached. Nevertheless, it creates serious security threats. In [7]
a publisher periodically generates a symmetric encryption
key and encrypts it with the public keys of all legitimate
subscribers. It then uses this key to encrypt all content items.
If the private key of a subscriber is compromised then all
previous messages can be decrypted, therefore this scheme
does not provide forward secrecy. Moreover, it is possible
for a third party to determine if two users received the
same piece of content, therefore this scheme does provide
unlinkability. In [8] a publisher splits a content item in chunks
and encrypts each chunk using two keys. The second key
changes periodically in a way that given a key at time t, all
keys generated at any time l < t can be generated. The second
key is the same for a “group of subscribers”, therefore it is
possible to distinguish if two subscribers that belong to the
same group have received the same content item. Moreover,
this key is delivered to authorized subscribers by following a
key exchange protocol during which the key is encrypted using
a session key. The session key is generated by the subscriber
and it is transmitted to the publisher encrypted using the
publisher’s public key. Therefore, if the publisher’s private key
is compromised all previous communication can be decrypted.
Wood and Uzun [9] encrypt content items with a symmetric
key and then encrypt the symmetric keys with a public key
encryption scheme that facilitates proxy re-encryption. Again,
it is possible for an attacker to link two information flows.
Moreover, if the symmetric key is compromised all previous
transactions can be decrypted. The work in [10] uses Identity-
Based Encryption in order to encrypt a symmetric encryption
key that has been used for encrypting a piece of content. As in
all previous related work, there is no unlinkability. Moreover,
if the private key of a subscriber is compromised, all previous
communication can be decrypted.
B. Middlebox support
As HTTPS traffic increases, middleboxes become less ef-
fective. In order to mitigate this problem, the IETF HTTPBis
Working Group has drafted a proposal for “explicit trusted”
proxies [11]. Explicit trusted proxies are authorized by end-
users to fetch secured content on behalf of them. Nevertheless,
this solution has many shortcomings: end-users are involved
in the proxy selection process, HTTP clients have to be
modified and web servers have no control over the process.
Sherry et al. [12] follow another approach. In their solution, a
server includes in every TLS packet some “attributes” of the
(encrypted) content item e.g., its type, possible age restrictions
etc. These tokens are encrypted in a form that only authorized
middleboxes can inspect. Nevertheless, these middleboxes
have very limited control over the encrypted content.
With our solution, middleboxes have full access to the
content, therefore they are able to cache it or manipulate it.
Middlebox support is completely transparent to subscribers,
i.e., a subscriber is not able to tell whether it interacts with
a middlebox or a publisher. Moreover, a publisher has full
control of the process, i.e., at any time it may prevent a
middlebox for intercepting secured communication. Finally,
a middlebox learns no publisher-related secrets.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper we proposed a TLS-based security solution for
ICN. In particular, we proposed modifications to TLS so that
it can be effectively used in a content-centric environment. We
chose to modify TLS, instead of creating a clean slate solution,
since TLS is an industry standard and its security properties
are continuously examined and tested by many researchers
around the world. The main challenges which we came across
were: how to allow the network to transparently migrate a
process from one publisher to another, as well as, how to
enable middlebox support without modifying the subscriber-
side part of the protocol.
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